• North American Studies

This paper takes a second look at the 2016 American Presidential Primaries from the perspective of asking what the American people were really after then they chose to ultimately support populism. Media reports and editorial discussions all pointed to a base that was somehow backing misogyny and racism. My research points to an alternative. Populism and social movement theory suggest that the success of anti-establishment candidacies is not credited to populists alone; in the case of 2016, it had support in the credibility and political opportunity left by social movements past. And so to investigate this historic battle between the establishment and anti-establishment candidacies, we can look to what populism and social movements have in common, and how they merge during the framing process. Within this context, this research seeks to answer how the anti-establishment candidates of the 2016 American Primaries framed a battle against 'the establishment' – within an establishment arena and won. By seeing populism as more of a logic as opposed to an ideology, we can eliminate a partisan lens in the study of what happened in 2016. By seeing populism as a strategy when added to a collective action frame of a social movement, we can analyze how it was used to mobilize voters to action. By using populism and social movement theory, we can add further context to what voters were experiencing in 2016. This study uses a populist master frame analysis of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Primary debates, which ultimately illustrates the efficacy of populist messaging while exposing the weaknesses of the establishment rhetorical response. Findings suggest that populist candidates unearthed deep insecurities in 2016, specifically in areas concerning the economy, foreign policy, and within the identities affected by loss, discrimination and threats to human rights.

The central purpose of this thesis is systematically to show why politicians use direct democracy in the US. By identifying multiple situations in which politicians make use of direct democracy, the argument that they use it for some gain is made irresistible and the reasons underlying this behaviour are brought out. Politicians are shown to use direct democracy in three arenas: before launching a candidacy for state-wide office, whilst running for state-wide office and whilst in government. Politicians are shown to do so to expand their public profile, to change campaign agendas, and at the level of the institutions of state government, to bypass another branch of government. These effects are shown using statistical tests of the occurrence of behaviour by state legislators and candidates in the first two instances. Multilevel models are used in the last two instances, to identify when state legislators and governors used direct democracy in battles over lawmaking between the branches of government. A test for the use of the legislative referral by state legislatures is particularly timely and has not been considered before. These uses together lay the groundwork for a new theory of the effects of direct democracy institutions on state government policy. The tests of policy responsiveness in later chapters reject existing theory that might provide an explanation of both why politicians use direct democracy and with what effects on state government and show on responsiveness increasing effect.

The 2000 US Presidential Election brought the confusing array of electoral rules to the minds of many in the mass media and politics. One reform advocated to improve the integrity of elections was to require voters to present identification at the polls prior to receiving a ballot. This particular reform generated much controversy, as critics worried that millions of citizens would be denied a ballot because they lacked government-issued photo ID, a form of ID advocated by many Republican officials. The controversy extended to the courts, with photo ID requirements upheld by a 6-3 US Supreme Court decision in 2008 in part due to the lack of evidence that ID laws prevented any citizens from voting. Consequently, over 30 states now require some form of ID of all voters in elections prior to receiving a ballot. Surprisingly, extant research has failed to uncover evidence of a consistent impact on voter participation. My research shows that the best way to understand whether and how voter ID laws impact turnout in national elections is to begin with a theory of how these laws are shaped by the strategic environment faced by the state political parties whose job is to win elections. Using a variety of data sources, I examine how ID laws impact political participation in the US. This includes examining both what factors led some states to adopt these laws as well as their impact on voter participation and mobilization. I find that laws appear to be adopted primarily for strategic reasons rather than to combat voter fraud. States with growing minority populations and large gaps between midterm and presidential election turnout are more likely to enact photo ID laws than other states. Showing that partisan concerns impact adoption. However, using aggregate turnout from both states and counties in past federal elections I do not find any consistent negative impact. Surprisingly, photo ID laws appear to increase turnout in states with large African American populations, with a significant negative impact only in areas with few minority voters. I attribute this to a change in campaign strategy where Democratic groups are using laws to mobilize minority voters. Using survey data from 2010 and 2012 I show that African Americans are more likely to be contacted in states with photo ID laws, which helps explain the surprising impact of these laws on voter turnout. While ID laws may have been enacted to achieve a partisan advantage for Republicans, these reforms do not take place in a vacuum where they are immune to any response. Critics and opponents of voter ID requirements may be successfully using these laws to mobilize the very groups they are thought to suppress.

There have been several key moments in immigration reform in the United States since the 1960s, starting with major change in immigration policy that took place under President Johnson in 1965. This paper will examine two key moments of successful reform in US history - The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, and the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. In recent times however, Americans have seen the failure of Congress to enact immigration reform, and the use by Presidents Obama and Trump of executive authority in order to bring about any sort of changes. Consequently, this paper will also examine one key moment of unsuccessful reform effort of the US Congress to enact immigration reform - the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013. I will argue that increased political polarization in American politics and in Congress, is largely responsible for this country’s failure to address comprehensive immigration reform today. Using qualitative analysis and the partisan polarization theoretical framework posited by Alan I. Abramowitz, this paper will undertake a comparative case study approach to examine the underlying factors that appear to have influenced the lack of immigration reform in the United States in recent times. These include partisan polarization, bipartisanship, and public attitudes. The paper assesses the factors seemingly responsible for the success, or failure of immigration reform at each of these three key points in time – 1965, 1986, and 2013.

The central purpose of this thesis is systematically to show why politicians use direct democracy in the US. By identifying multiple situations in which politicians make use of direct democracy, the argument that they use it for some gain is made irresistible and the reasons underlying this behaviour are brought out. Politicians are shown to use direct democracy in three arenas: before launching a candidacy for state-wide office, whilst running for state-wide office and whilst in government. Politicians are shown to do so to expand their public profile, to change campaign agendas, and at the level of the institutions of state government, to bypass another branch of government. These effects are shown using statistical tests of the occurrence of behaviour by state legislators and candidates in the first two instances. Multilevel models are used in the last two instances, to identify when state legislators and governors used direct democracy in battles over lawmaking between the branches of government. A test for the use of the legislative referral by state legislatures is particularly timely and has not been considered before. These uses together lay the groundwork for a new theory of the effects of direct democracy institutions on state government policy. The tests of policy responsiveness in later chapters reject existing theory that might provide an explanation of both why politicians use direct democracy and with what effects on state government and show on responsiveness increasing effect.

Over the course of twelve Congressional sessions and twenty plus years since the passage of landmark gun control legislation (the Brady Bill and the Assault weapons ban) during the 103rd Congress, (1993-1994) polarization on the gun control issue between the Democratic and Republican parties has increased significantly. Applying mixed qualitative methods, this case study aims to explain the shift from moderate levels during the 103rd to near complete partisan polarization on the issue by the 115th Congress (2017-2018). It will demonstrate that this shift was the culmination of the dissolution of opposition groups (consisting of members who crossed the party line in their gun issue voting) within each party, with each party following its own unique polarization trajectory, as disparate factors influenced their respective shifts. For the Republican party, who united on the issue over a decade before the Democratic party, the key variables impacting the fading of party support for gun control were the decline in salience of crime as a priority political issue in the early 2000s and the transition from the general to the primary electorate as the more salient voting bloc in regard to gun control. For the Democratic party, the key variables impacting the fading of party opposition to gun control were a loss of Southern and rural seats, coupled with gun control being re established as an electorally valuable issue for the party nationally in the years after the Sandy Hook shooting in late 2012. The thesis will contest the prevailing narrative that changes in party voting patterns must occur through replacement by demonstrating evidence of conversion- as numerous members of both parties shifted positions on gun control to vote the party line as electoral pressures and incentives influencing opposition group member voting changed. Furthermore, the thesis’s findings bolster the utility of ‘partisan asymmetry’ as a lens through which to approach the study of partisan polarization in Congress.

American democratic politics has always been messy. In fact, the political system was designed that way—to be a bit scrappy and quarrelsome when it comes to making new laws of the land. The institutional fragmentation that is codified in the constitution results in many avenues to make policy but just as many brakes to block it. While the Founding Fathers certainly wanted checks and balances in their new nation, they also believed in honoring what the Declaration of Independence called “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.” The Founders believed that any person of good will and common sense will be reasonable enough to understand the justice of the American’s cause. But looking at Washington politics today, it feels like elected officials are preoccupied with ideology and have forgotten that compromise, based on a shared understanding of what is morally right, lies at the heart of the system.